The conflict of interests between the government and the enterprise plays a critical role in the effect of water pollution control. In order to resolve that conflict, corresponding government policy should be made. However, the current policies are all limited to the pollution tax or the incentive mechanism, respectively. This paper presents a principal-agent model taking the both policies into consideration. The optimal ration of water pollution control amount under the given policy is investigated. The relationships among the optimal ration of water pollution control amount and the awards proportion for water pollution control and the pollution tax rate are presented. An example is given to illustrate the idea of the proposed model and the effectiveness of the designed algorithm, which shows that incentive policy and pollution tax both have positive influence on enterprise's reduction in water pollution. Further, it proves that the government applied the combined policy of water pollution control incentive policy and pollution tax charging is better than applying any of them separately. The enterprise's optimal strategy of water pollution control adaptive to the government supervision can be obtained from the proposed model.
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